

ACTIVE SHOOTER / CRIMINAL MASS CASUALTY PROTOCOL

2015

*Santa Clara County
Police and Fire
Chiefs' Associations*



Adopted: November 2015

**Santa Clara County Police Chiefs' Association
Members**

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL
Captain Les Bishop

CAMPBELL POLICE DEPARTMENT
Chief David Carmichael

GILROY POLICE DEPARTMENT
Chief Denise Turner

LOS ALTOS POLICE DEPARTMENT
Chief Tuck Younis

**LOS GATOS/MONTE SERENO POLICE
DEPARTMENT**
Chief Matt Frisby

MILPITAS POLICE DEPARTMENT
Chief Steve Pangelinan

MORGAN HILL POLICE DEPARTMENT
Chief David Swing

MOUNTAIN VIEW POLICE DEPARTMENT
Chief Max Bosel

PALO ALTO POLICE DEPARTMENT
Chief Dennis Burns

SAN JOSE POLICE DEPARTMENT
Chief Larry Esquivel

**SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT**
Chief Pete Decena

**SANTA CLARA COUNTY DISTRICT
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE**
D.A. Jeffrey Rosen

**SANTA CLARA COUNTY SHERIFF'S
OFFICE**
Sheriff Laurie Smith

SANTA CLARA POLICE DEPARTMENT
Chief Michael Sellers

**SUNNYVALE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY**
Chief Frank Grgurina



Pete Decena
President, Santa Clara County Police Chiefs' Association

12/17/15

Date

**Santa Clara County Fire Chiefs' Association
Members**

GILROY FIRE DEPARTMENT

Chief Alan Anderson

MILPITAS FIRE DEPARTMENT

Chief Robert Mihovich

MOUNTAIN VIEW FIRE DEPARTMENT

Chief Juan Diaz

NASA-AMES RESEARCH CENTER

Chief Roger Bloom

PALO ALTO FIRE DEPARTMENT

Chief Eric Nickel

SAN JOSE FIRE DEPARTMENT

Chief Curtis Jacobson

**SANTA CLARA COUNTY FIRE
DEPARTMENT**

Chief Ken Kehmna

SANTA CLARA FIRE DEPARTMENT

Chief Bill Kelly

**SOUTH SANTA CLARA COUNTY FIRE
DISTRICT / MORGAN HILL FIRE**

Chief Derek Witmer

**SUNNYVALE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY**

Chief Steve Drowniany



Eric Nickel
President, Santa Clara County Fire Chiefs' Association

12.17.15

Date

POLICY STATEMENT

After the Columbine tragedy in 1999, law enforcement agencies across the nation transitioned to the rapid response model in addressing active shooter scenarios, and the Santa Clara County Police Chiefs Association developed the Active Shooter Protocol. Previous versions of this protocol focused solely on law enforcement's initial response to the incident. This update seeks to include Fire resources in order to provide an integrated, comprehensive response to an Active Shooter /Criminal Mass Casualty Incident. Due to the complexity, size and scope of these incidents, a multi-agency response can be anticipated. The County Chiefs' Associations acknowledge a shared commitment to properly train, equip and exercise for such an incident. This protocol is indicative of the County Chiefs' Associations' absolute commitment to a well-coordinated response to an Active Shooter /Criminal Mass Casualty Incident.

Tragically, over the last decade the frequency and severity of active shooter incidents have increased dramatically. Law enforcement researchers and practitioners have studied these incidents and new best practices have emerged. This protocol seeks to implement these best practices to provide a framework to facilitate a comprehensive and effective response. These best practices include:

- Integration of Fire/EMS into the response has been identified as a key life-saving effort.
- Inclusion of the Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 requires domestic incidents to be managed by the National Incident Management System (NIMS) including a focus on Unified Command.
- Investigative Assistance for Violent Crimes Act of 2012 enables the FBI to assist local law enforcement agencies in the investigation of Active Shooter Incidents.
- Development of a framework for a primary, secondary and long-term response.

Because of the many varying factors that can influence an Active Shooter /Criminal Mass Casualty Incident, there should not be one universal tactical policy. There are, however, some known factors that should be considered to guide the tactical decision-making:

- 1) Field officers and supervisors should be capable of distinguishing between an active shooter event and a traditional criminal action (e.g., a hostage/barricade situation), and be able to direct an appropriate immediate tactical response to either event.
- 2) All personnel involved in the response must seek to realistically assess the initial situation and the perceived threats involved (e.g. number of suspects, skill level,

types of weapons). As the incident unfolds, responders must continually reassess the situation and the effectiveness of the response.

- 3) Law enforcement must be prepared to take immediate steps to neutralize or resolve those conditions that are life-threatening. But before deploying personnel into a dangerous situation, the following factors must be considered:
 - a) The mission or objective should be clear and obtainable, given the circumstances known at the time
 - b) The appropriate number of personnel with the equipment, skill and ability should be assigned to reasonably accomplish the objective
 - In some cases, intervention by a solo law enforcement officer may be necessary to save lives.
 - In all cases, responding officers must assess the situation and implement a plan of action that maximizes the potential for success while minimizing the possibility of casualties
- 4) The actions of all responders should be consistent with their statutory authority, training, certifications and the responsibilities of their employing agency. However, unusual assignments are likely and all responders should expect that they may be assigned to perform tasks they have not experienced in past incidents.
- 5) Care and evacuation of the injured victims must be initiated as soon as practical following neutralization or containment of the active threat or arrival of sufficient resources to allow the implementation of Rescue Task Forces.

The Active Shooter Protocol is consistent with the “Run, Hide, Defend” video and presentation that was produced in 2014 by the Santa Clara County Police Chiefs Association. This video was designed to provide local school districts and educators with direction should their institutions become involved in an Active Shooter / Criminal Mass Casualty incident.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CAL FIRE

California Highway Patrol
Campbell Police Department
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Gilroy Police and Fire Departments
Los Altos Police Department
Los Gatos - Monte Sereno Police Department
Milpitas Police and Fire Departments
Morgan Hill Police Department
Mountain View Police and Fire Departments
NASA / AMES Research Center Fire Department
Palo Alto Police and Fire Departments
San Jose Police and Fire Departments
San Jose State University Police Department
Santa Clara County Office of the District Attorney
Santa Clara Police and Fire Departments
Santa Clara County Fire Department
Santa Clara County Office of the Sheriff
South Santa Clara County Fire District / Morgan Hill Fire / CAL FIRE Santa Clara Unit
Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety

Although many hands were involved at the beginning of this latest revision, the following individuals deserve special recognition for their efforts in evolving the protocol to its final version:

- Deputy Chief Joe Parker, Santa Clara County Fire Department
- Battalion Chief Richard Alameda, Mountain View Fire Department
- Lieutenant David Santos, San Jose Police Department
- Lieutenant Doug Sims, Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety
- Sergeant Kurt Ashley, Gilroy Police Department

We thank them for their hard work and commitment to keeping their communities safe.

Dennis Burns
Chief of Police
Palo Alto Police Department

Pete Decena
Chief of Police
San Jose State University Police Department

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Policy Statement	2
Acknowledgements	4
Definitions	6
Initial Actions	10
Incident Command	11
Incident Communications	14
Operations	14
Responsibilities of Allied /Adjoining Law Enforcement Agencies	20
Post Incident Investigation	21
Departmental Administrative Responsibilities and Commitments	22
Appendix 1: Initial Response Organizational Chart	23
Appendix 2: Multi-Division Response Organizational Chart	24
Appendix 3: Multi-Branch Response Organizational Chart	25

DEFINITIONS

- A. **Active Shooter** An incident, normally occurring in a confined and populated area, during which one or more armed persons are using deadly force in an on-going manner and where persons have been killed, injured or are under imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm by such persons. In most cases, active shooters use firearms and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims.
- B. **Incident Command System (ICS)** A scalable response system of organization used for the command, control, and coordination of emergency operations of all types and complexities. ICS provides a standard management hierarchy that allows personnel from a wide variety of agencies to meld rapidly into a common management structure working toward a single set of objectives as developed through an incident action plan (IAP). Fundamental concepts of ICS include unity of command, span of control, common terminology, and comprehensive resource management. It provides logistical and administrative support to operational staff. ICS is a subcomponent of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and California's Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) and is adopted as the incident management system to be used for operations under this policy.
- C. **Incident Commander** The person responsible for all aspects of an emergency response, including quickly developing incident objectives, managing all incident operations, application of resources as well as responsibility for all persons involved. The role of Incident Commander (IC) *may* be assumed by senior or higher-qualified officers upon their arrival or as the situation dictates. The IC performs all ICS command and staff responsibilities unless those functions are delegated and assigned. The first arriving law enforcement officer, regardless of actions taken, still assumes the responsibilities and functions of the IC until relieved of command by a subsequent arriving officer of higher qualification.
- D. **Unified Command** Involves two or more individuals sharing the authority normally held by a single IC. Unified Command is used on larger or complex incidents when multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictions are involved. A Unified Command typically includes a command representative from major involved agencies and/or jurisdictions co-located at a single incident command post (ICP). A Unified Command acts as a single entity and operates from a single agreed upon set of objectives. It is important to note that in Unified Command, the command representatives will appoint a single Operations Section Chief.

- E. **Contact Team** An organized group of 1-4 law enforcement officers who enter an area or building where an active threat is believed to be currently using deadly force. The sole function of the Contact Team is to isolate, capture or neutralize the suspect(s) by arrest or deadly force.
- F. **Rescue Task Force** A team deployed into a potential Warm Zone to provide point of wound care to victims. This team(s) treats, stabilizes, and removes the injured in a rapid manner under protection of law enforcement personnel. A Rescue Task Force (RTF) may be comprised of 2-4 law enforcement personnel providing force protection along with 2-4 Fire-based EMS providers. Ideally, each RTF should include at least one paramedic provider. RTF functions are very discipline-specific (the primary and sole purpose of fire personnel is the rescue and treatment of injured persons, while the primary and sole purpose of law enforcement personnel is force protection).
- G. **Force Protection** Actions taken by law enforcement to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against response personnel, resources, and facilities. Force protection for fire personnel will only be provided by law enforcement personnel.
- H. **Tactical Group Supervisor** The person responsible for the operations and deployment of the tactical team, to include but not limited to the deployment of the initial responding police officers such as Contact Teams, containment officers, and RTF teams. The Tactical Group Supervisor will work closely with a Rescue Group Supervisor (Fire) on the deployment of fire personnel in RTFs.
- I. **Hot Zone** The area where a direct and immediate threat exists. Activities in this area are restricted to law enforcement Contact Teams working to isolate, capture or neutralize the active threat. A direct and immediate threat is very dynamic and is determined by the complexity and unique circumstances of the incident. Law enforcement should also consider the area to be immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH) if they can observe the shooter or identified threat. Fire personnel will not intentionally work in this zone. The IC shall ensure Hot Zone boundaries are established and communicated to on-scene personnel.
- J. **Warm Zone** The area where a potential threat exists, but the threat is not direct or immediate. The Warm Zone is an area that law enforcement Contact Teams have cleared. An example of this is an unknown location of suspects in a given area already cleared. Fire department resources may be requested to enter into Warm Zones, but this should only be done with force protection. These instances could be utilized for rapid extrication of multiple victims or officers down who need immediate assistance. Prior to entering into a Warm Zone, a risk-versus-gain-analysis should be completed by the Rescue Group Supervisor.

- K. **Cold Zone** The area where no significant danger or threat can be reasonably anticipated. This could be achieved by distance, geographic location or inaccessible areas from the incident. The Cold Zone is the location for staging of resources, ICP, treatment and transportation of patients.
- L. **Cleared Area** An area that has been initially cleared by Contact Team members and is determined to be safe for RTF. This area may contain CCPs.
- M. **Secured Area** An area that has been systematically cleared by law enforcement and found to be free of threats. These areas have had secondary searches conducted and security has been actively maintained.
- N. **Cover** Any physical object or barrier that is capable of providing a responder with protection from gunfire.
- O. **Concealment** An area or object that prevents or limits a suspect's ability to observe a responder, but that may not provide protection from gunfire.
- P. **Staging Area** The Staging Area is a centralized location in the Cold Zone, near the incident scene where arriving resources will assemble once ready for assignment. It should be close enough to the incident scene to provide timely access, but located in an area that is out of the way and not exposed to the incident's hazards. Unless assigned enroute by the IC, all arriving resources should respond to the identified Staging Area. Police, fire, and ambulance staging may be co-located in the same area or separately as space and operational needs dictate. Ambulance staging location should be close to and have easy access to Patient Treatment Areas. Establishing a Staging Area and Staging Area Manager reduces apparatus and vehicle congestion, enhances emergency scene accountability, and places resources in uncommitted locations close to the scene to facilitate effective assignment by command.
- Q. **Casualty Collection Point** A Casualty Collection Point (CCP) is a location within the Warm Zone, under force protection, where casualties MAY be kept and receive medical care until they can be safely moved to a Patient Treatment Area. Fire-based EMS providers will work as RTFs with law enforcement protection in this area. Based on the situation and physical layout of the scene, establishing a CCP may not be advantageous to rapid treatment and transportation of patients. In some cases, patients should be moved directly from where they are found to either a Patient Triage/Treatment Area (Cold Zone) or a transport ambulance.

- R. **Triage Area** The Triage Area is located in the Cold Zone, and is where the process of determining the priority of patients' treatment based on the severity of their condition occurs. In Santa Clara County, the Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment/Transport (START) method shall be employed for the assignment of patient acuity levels. Patients shall be moved from the Triage Area to the appropriate Medical Treatment Area when feasible.
- S. **Patient Treatment Area** An area in a multi-casualty event under control of the Medical Group Supervisor or Treatment Unit Leader. Patient Treatment Areas should be established in a safe location in the Cold Zone, easily accessible to EMS transport vehicles arriving from medical staging. Patient Treatment Areas are staffed with EMS personnel who provide advanced and basic life support care, stabilization, and/or packaging of patients prior to transportation to definitive care.
- T. **Evacuation Corridor** An area inside the Warm Zone, secured by law enforcement personnel (force protection), that allows for the egress of victims to a CCP, or from the CCP to a triage/treatment area, in a mitigated risk environment.
- U. **Stop Point** Term used to describe a situation in which a RTF alters its objective or encounters a change of conditions that affects its movement (e.g. running out of supplies, encountering an IED, reaching the edge of the Hot Zone, or determining that there are no additional patients). When using this term, the reason should be communicated (i.e., "We've reached a stop point as we have advanced to the edge of the Hot Zone.").
- V. **Inner Perimeter** Deployment of law enforcement officers on or near the boundary between the Hot Zone and the Warm Zone whose primary function is to contain an active threat.
- W. **Outer Perimeter** Deployment of personnel where appropriate in order to exclude unauthorized persons from entering potential danger areas or otherwise interfering with response operations.
- X. **Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (TECC)** Forward deployment of stabilizing medical interventions in civilian disaster scenarios, based on military Tactical Casualty Combat Care (TCCC) principles. These principles focus on the three most common cause of preventable death in combat (active shooting) situations: 1) extremity hemorrhage, 2) tension pneumothorax, and 3) airway obstructions. All of these are treatable in the field with minimal equipment.

INITIAL ACTIONS

I. Law Enforcement

- A. Assess the situation, determine whether the incident is active or static
- B. It shall be the responsibility of the first arriving officer to establish Incident Command (until relieved)
- C. Provide Communications with initial overview and request additional resources
- D. Notify Communications of initial law enforcement actions being taken
- E. The first arriving officer may immediately move to the threat. It is still the responsibility of the initial officer to coordinate incoming response while actively seeking the threat
- F. Assemble Contact Team(s)
- G. Establish Inner/Outer Perimeter
- H. Identify ICP and staging locations
- I. Once the ICP is established, all incoming units will respond to the staging area and shall not self-deploy into the incident
- J. Establish Unified Command with fire and develop unified objectives
- K. Establish Hot, Warm, and Cold Zones
- L. Coordinate with fire for potential assembly/deployment of RTF
- M. Be cognizant of the possibility of secondary threats

II. Fire

- A. Establish Unified Command with law and develop unified objectives
- B. Determine cause/mechanism and current threat. Establish Hot, Warm, and Cold Zones accordingly
- C. Identify ICP and staging locations
- D. Control walking wounded and assist with rapid egress of victims
- E. Estimate potential patient count and location. Match tactical priorities with responding fire and EMS resources. Consider upgrading alarm and MCI level. Initial response should include full first alarm plus level 1 MCI
- F. Identify safe travel routes
- G. Coordinate with law for potential assembly/deployment of RTF
- H. Establish Medical Group, Rescue Group, identify CCPs, and treatment areas
- I. Determine overhead and support needs (i.e., Overhead Support Team, Mobile Command Center)

III. Communications Centers

- A. Confirm type of violence, number of suspects and whereabouts, number of potential victims, location, and other intelligence related to type of threat
- B. Dispatch/Response
 - 1. An incident of this magnitude and/or complexity will require a multi-discipline multi-jurisdictional response. A county-wide standardized CAD

dispatch call type will be created for consistency. Santa Clara County fire, law, and EMS agencies adopt the terminology of "**Active Shooter.**"

2. Fire will operate per Santa Clara County Mutual Aid Plan Appendix 1 – Radio Communications Plan. All fire dispatch Communication Centers shall be notified by means of a "Red Net" broadcast or via the SVRCS Significant Event Radio Communications Protocol announcing an "active shooter" incident.
 - (a) The initial standard county-wide fire response to these types of events should be the equivalent of a full first alarm (e.g. 3 engines, 2 truck, and 2 battalion chiefs). The initial county-based EMS response will be a Level 1 MCI activation.
 3. Notify and provide developing information to all adjoining law enforcement jurisdiction communications networks.
 - (a) It shall be the responsibility of any adjoining law enforcement jurisdiction ranking field supervisor to provide information to their Communications Center regarding all available resources that could be called upon to assist in the resolution of an active shooter situation.
- C. Additional support and logistical resources should be considered early in the event to include:
- (a) County Overhead Support Team
 - (b) Mobile Command Vehicles
 - (c) Incident Dispatchers
 - (d) Fire Associates
 - (e) EMS Multi-Casualty Trailers
 - (f) Bomb Squads
 - (g) Helicopters
 - (h) SWAT Teams
 - (i) Armored Vehicles

INCIDENT COMMAND

- I. **Unified Command** – (Law, Fire, EMS) The first arriving fire officer shall establish Unified Command with the first arriving law enforcement officer that remains in a command position not directly assigned as a Contact Team member. Unified Command is likely to include a representative from County EMS as well as an administrator or representative of the involved school, business, or property. Unified Command will work cooperatively in accordance with ICS principles. Responsibilities of Incident Command (whether Unified Command is implemented or a single IC exists) include:
 - A. Activate the Incident Command System/establish an Incident Command Post
 - B. Identify and implement common incident objectives
 - C. Create incident organization commensurate with current situation

- D. Provide operational and logistical resources sufficient to mitigate situation and/or support extended operations
- E. Provide for the safety of citizens and responding personnel
- F. Provide timely and accurate information and notifications

II. Safety Officer (SOF) - The IC shall designate a SOF to develop and recommend measures for assuring personnel safety and to assess and/or anticipate hazardous and unsafe situations. The incident safety plan shall contain strategies and tactics developed by the SOF based upon the IC's incident action plan and type of incident. Only one SOF will be assigned at each incident, but assistants may be designated as necessary.

- A. Prepare and enforce medical plan
- B. Investigate and report all accidents
- C. Monitor the physical and mental health of responders
- D. Assign Assistant Safety Officers as necessary
- E. The Safety Officer will ensure the following:
 - 1. Inner/Outer Perimeter and Control Zones are established and communicated to all personnel
 - 2. ICP located in safe and secure area
 - 3. Adequate Force Protection for ICP, Treatment Area, Staging Area, and other functional areas
 - 4. All personnel are adequately briefed before entering Warm/Hot Zones
 - 5. Appropriate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and tools are available and in use
 - 6. Adequate rehabilitation process and facilities are in place relative to duration, exertion levels, and environmental conditions
 - 7. Apparatus and vehicles are parked in manner to provide for easy ingress and rapid egress for changing conditions
 - 8. Safe landing zone is established, if necessary

III. Public Information Officer (PIO) - Events of this nature will quickly draw a significant amount of media attention. To minimize confusion and ensure a consistent message, a PIO should be identified early in the incident.

- A. The IC/Unified Command shall approve any information released to the PIO or directly to the media.
- B. Consider use of a Joint Information System (JIS) that consolidates all agency and incident information flow from the multitude of agencies involved. A JIS can establish a well-controlled information sharing plan amongst agencies.
- C. Utilize a Joint Information Center (JIC) to house the JIS. Do not co-locate the JIC at the ICP.
- D. Media affiliates may have aviation assets that may be co-opted for use in scene surveys, but need to be controlled to ensure safety of operations.

- E. Develop plan for media announcements regarding Staging Area for parents/relatives of victims.
- F. Consider use of social media and emergency notification systems such as AlertSCC to disseminate information to the community.
- G. Assign PIOs or Liaison Officers to support families of casualties in handling media requests.
- H. Designate a media staging area and communicate its location to the press.

IV. Planning/Intelligence Section Chief (PSC) - The PSC is responsible for the collection, evaluation, dissemination and use of information about the development of the incident and status of resources. The PSC is also responsible for facilitating the Planning Process.

- A. The IC should ensure that a specific law enforcement officer is designated as the PSC or Deputy PSC. This PSC law enforcement officer shall be responsible to coordinate incoming information and serve in the central role in the creation of the law enforcement report after the incident
 - 1. Coordinate collection of pertinent investigative information on the situation and suspect(s), including:
 - (a) Identity
 - (b) Crimes committed; intent
 - (c) Additional threats
 - (d) Residence and vehicle(s)
 - (e) Known associates
 - (f) Secondary victim locations
 - 2. Ensure that, as reasonably practicable, escaping innocent persons are identified, separated, and interviewed in a timely manner
 - 3. Process information to develop new intelligence about suspect and situation
 - 4. Arrange for additional investigation and information gathering
 - 5. Ensure accurate information is gathered regarding the identities, locations, and status of any persons involved in or seriously affected by the incident
- B. The PSC or Deputy PSC not assigned to intelligence shall be responsible for the collection, evaluation, dissemination, and use of information about the development of the incident and status of resources. This person is also responsible for the Planning Process and to facilitate preparation of the IAP
 - 1. Situation status
 - 2. Resource status
 - 3. Technical specialists
 - 4. Incident demobilization

V. Logistics Section Chief (LSC) - The LSC is responsible for providing facilities, services, and supplies in support of the incident. The IC may authorize the assignment of a Deputy LSC to provide discipline-specific knowledge and expertise to complement that of the LSC (e.g. the LSC could be a law enforcement officer who

orders law-related resources, assisted by a fire officer serving as the Deputy LSC, who orders all fire and EMS resources).

- A. Designated as the primary authority to order resources
- B. Establish single point ordering
- C. Medical unit
- D. Food
- E. Personnel rotation
- F. Communications
- G. Transportation
- H. Supplies
- I. Specialized teams/equipment

INCIDENT COMMUNICATIONS

I. Command

- A. Law and fire will remain on their assigned radio channels to limit confusion
 - 1. Fire will not communicate on law frequencies and law will not communicate on fire frequencies
 - 2. Strong Unified Command and the use of Deputy Section Chiefs will ensure effective interoperability and good communications between law and fire
 - 3. If an alternate frequency is necessary and the SVRCS Significant Event Radio Communications Protocol is not in place, utilization of Bay MACS may be considered

II. Tactical

- A. Provide a tactical channel for Rescue Group, Medical Group, and RTF
 - 1. RTF Communications – RTF communications function on two different radio nets. This dual communication model allows for accountability and effective use of the teams, as well as for planning and management of any CCPs, Medical Treatment Areas, and additional EMS resources
 - (a) The RTF law enforcement personnel communicate with the Tactical Group Supervisor providing information like the location of the team, updates on the location of the injured and Contact Teams, and possible threats
 - (b) The RTF fire personnel communicate with the Rescue Group Supervisor to report the number of victims, types and severity of injuries, and victim removal needs. The Rescue Group Supervisor should communicate this information to the Medical Group Supervisor

OPERATIONS

- I. **Operations Section Chief (OSC) – (Law, Fire)** The IC shall establish a single OSC that may be supported by a Deputy OSC. In the initial phases of the event, it may work best with law serving as the OSC with fire serving as Deputy OSC. This arrangement provides the discipline-specific expertise/technical knowledge necessary to establish the division assignments in support of the overall incident objectives. If the incident transitions from a threat-neutralization focus to a patient treatment/transportation focus, the IC may elect to transition the law officer out of the OSC position, replacing them with the fire Deputy OSC. Likewise if the patient treatment/transportation piece of the event is complete, the IC may demobilize the Deputy OSC position. The OSC and Deputy OSC shall work cooperatively to:
 - A. Gather information from active field units
 - B. Identify critical factors and establish tactical objectives
 - C. Directs activities of assigned Divisions/Groups
 - D. Identify and establish Staging Area(s)

- II. **Tactical Group Supervisor – (Law)** A supervisor from the agency having primary jurisdiction of the incident. The Tactical Group Supervisor shall have specific operational control of the crime scene from the Inner Perimeter forward. It shall be the responsibility of the Tactical Group Supervisor, upon the direction of the IC, to supervise the tactical response segment of the plan of action
 - A. The tactical response shall be designed to affect a timely and effective resolution of the incident
 - B. The scope of this response shall depend on the known threat conditions, available law enforcement resources, and the likelihood of a successful tactical intervention
 - C. The objective of the tactical response shall be:
 1. Stop the criminal acts being committed by either eliminating the threat or by confining the suspect(s) to a point where the threat to others is eliminated (the threat is neutralized)
 2. Protect against or minimize injuries or the loss of life to victims, hostages, citizens or residents and officers who may be so imperiled
 3. Apprehend suspect(s) and secure a crime scene
 4. Protect against or minimize the loss of property
 - D. Although terminology may differ among agencies and tactics will depend upon the nature of the situation and the availability of resources, it is of paramount importance that the IC consider the following basic contingencies and universal priority:
 1. **Contact Team(s)**
 - (a) Move quickly towards the location of the active shooter
 - (b) Report the location of the threat to the IC
 - (c) Stop the threat utilizing the appropriate level of force for the situation.
 - (d) Communicate the location of injured victims for the RTF
 2. **Rescue Task Force(s)**

- (a) Coordinates with Rescue Group Supervisor
 - (i) Determine need and location of CCP
 - (ii) Determines need and number of RTF
 - (iii) Provides force protection for RTF
- (b) Provides briefing to RTF fire and law officers
- (c) Point of radio contact for law enforcement personnel in RTF
 - (i) Directs route of travel and destination of RTF
 - (ii) Identifies evacuation corridors and maintains overall security of these corridors

3. Corridor Teams

- (a) Establish safe and secure evacuation corridors for access and egress for incoming personnel or for the safe extraction of personnel from critical areas
 - (b) Follow the Contact Team's route with the responsibility of searching and securing rooms and areas that were bypassed by the Contact Team and RTFs
 - (c) Stand prepared to assist either the Contact Team or RTF
- D. Once the tactical response segment of the plan of action is initiated, the Tactical Group Supervisor will work with the Rescue Group Supervisor to coordinate the formation and deployment of RTFs into the Warm Zone
- E. The Tactical Group Supervisor shall maintain a timely and continual line of communication with the IC, keeping command apprised of all progress and significant developments
- F. The tactical response shall continue until such time as the threat is captured or neutralized
1. The Tactical Group Supervisor shall immediately inform the IC when the threat is isolated, captured and/or neutralized
 - (a) The IC shall provide further direction to the Tactical Group Supervisor and make other notifications consistent with agency protocol and chain of command
 - (i) In the event of neutralization, the IC shall make immediate arrangements for:
 - ◆ Site security
 - ◆ Medical assistance to victims
 - ◆ Preservation of the crime scene
 - ◆ Initiation of the investigative process
 - ◆ Preparations for a return to normal activity
 - (ii) In the event a situation is neutralized, the IC shall evaluate the situation for the appropriate deployment of tactics and resources

III. Rescue Group Supervisor- (Fire) A Captain or Chief Officer responsible for the extraction of viable patients from the Warm Zone or CCP to Triage/Treatment Area. Working in conjunction with the Tactical Group Supervisor, organizes and

communicates with fire personnel within the RTFs working in the Warm Zone. If no Warm Zone exists, the Triage Unit leader will have the responsibility of coordinating the movement of patients to treatment areas.

- A. Coordinates with Tactical Group Supervisor
 1. Determines need and location of CCP
 2. Determines need and number of RTF based on:
 - (a) Victim count and ambulatory status
 - (b) CCP needs
 - (c) Available resources
- B. Provides briefing to RTF fire and law officers
- C. Coordinates extraction and movement of patients from Warm Zone/CCP to Patient Triage/Treatment Area
- D. Designate equipment staging and assembly area for RTF
 1. Area in Cold Zone should provide both cover and concealment
 2. Fire and police personnel report to area in full PPE with tactical, mission-specific EMS kits, and patient extraction equipment
 3. Access to established evacuation corridors
- E. Point of radio contact for fire personnel in RTF
 1. Communicate patient information from RTF to Medical Group Supervisor
 2. Coordinate with Tactical Group Supervisor regarding patient location and CCP location within Warm Zone
- F. Rescue Task Force Procedures
 1. RTF can be deployed to provide the following:
 - (a) Provide point of wound care where there is an ongoing ballistic or explosive threat
 - (b) Treat, stabilize and provide patient movement in Warm Zone or from Warm Zone to Cold Zone
 - (c) Movement of supplies from Cold Zone to Warm Zone
 - (d) Other duties deemed necessary to accomplish mission
 2. Initial RTF(s)
 - (a) Primary objective is to reduce mortality through the use of life-saving interventions for rapid hemorrhage, tension pneumothorax, and airway control in accordance with Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (TECC) guidelines. RTF(s) operating in the Warm Zone should not conduct triage. Non-ambulatory patients that have been attended to by an RTF should be identified/prioritized through the use of red- or black-striped plastic tape. Red tape will be used to indicate an injured but viable patient, while black-striped tape will indicate a non-viable patient
 - (b) RTF shall advance in the Warm Zone treating as many patients as possible until they reach the furthest accessible patient, stop point, or run out of supplies. They should begin extracting the furthest patients to the Patient Triage/Treatment Area or CCP

- (c) Communicate number, location, and extent of injuries back to Rescue Group Supervisor
 - (d) Activities of RTFs in the Warm Zone will transition from treating patients where they lie to extracting them to CCPs or Triage Area. This will occur as the number of available RTFs outstrips the number of patients who have not yet been contacted
3. Additional RTF(s)
 - (a) Provide stabilizing treatment of patients
 - (b) Extracting/evacuating critical patients identified by initial RTF to Patient Triage/Treatment Areas or CCP
 - (c) Provide secondary care to patients in established CCP
 4. Law enforcement personnel assigned to RTF
 - (a) Will provide security and control movement of RTF. They should not assist with any patient care or movement of patients
 - (b) Shall remain with the RTF and should not separate themselves from fire personnel. There may be instances where the Warm Zone suddenly becomes a Hot Zone. The law enforcement members of the RTF must be in position to immediately respond to that threat to ensure the safety of the team
 5. RTF Deployment
 - (a) RTF should move in and out of the Warm Zone only through entrances and corridors cleared by initial Contact Teams as identified by the Tactical Group Supervisor
 - (b) Initial RTF continue moving through the Warm Zone until they run out of medical supplies or patients. At that time they can start extracting patients to CCP or Triage/Treatment Area
 - (c) RTF shall be identified numerically in order of deployment (i.e., RTF 1, RTF 2 ...etc.)
 - (d) RTF will not deploy with less than 2 law enforcement members for force protection and will not self-deploy into the Warm Zone
 - (e) RTFs must be able to move quickly. As such, it is generally not advisable for them to be equipped with defibrillators, large drug boxes, gurneys, or other equipment that can affect their agility
 6. RTF Communications
 - (a) The fire team leader and the law enforcement team leader within the RTF will engage in continuous face to face communication
 - (b) Fire team leader in RTF shall maintain communication with the Rescue Group Supervisor via radio.
 - (c) Law enforcement team leader in RTF shall maintain communication with the Tactical Group Supervisor via radio
 7. Situational awareness
 - (a) All RTF members must maintain situational awareness and report to force protection if they see a weapon, explosive device, or any unusual situation

- (b) The RTF will identify areas of safe refuge as the team moves through the Warm Zone
- (c) If the zone in which the RTF is operating changes from a Warm Zone to a Hot Zone due to direct or immediate threat, force protection personnel will direct the immediate evacuation of the team to appropriate cover
- (d) The suspect(s) may be among the victims. Law enforcement officers will make a visual and physical body sweep of all victims for weapons or other secondary threats

IV. Casualty Collection Point (CCP) Supervisor - (Fire) Responsible for the short-term collection, sorting and limited first aid treatment of patients for rapid removal as soon as reasonably practicable to the Treatment/Transportation Area. The CCP Supervisor initially reports to the Rescue Group Supervisor, but must establish and maintain liaison with the Tactical Group Supervisor or the law enforcement team leader located within the CCP.

- A. Used for large area facilities with multiple casualties where evacuation distances are long or impossible due to ongoing threat. Based on incident dynamics, multiple CCPs may be required
- B. CCP provides cover to the injured and responders and is secured by law enforcement force protection.
- C. Formal triage procedures may or may not be initiated or completed at the CCP depending on conditions, patients, resources, etc.
- D. Point of wound medical stabilization should occur prior to evacuation to CCP. However, in extended incidents, ongoing treatment and/or advanced life support may be delivered in CCP
- E. Sorting of patients to prioritize movement to the treatment/transportation area
- F. Efforts should be made to not bring uninjured or deceased persons to the CCP
- G. Patient tracking should be instituted at the CCP to ensure accountability for all patients. Every attempt should be made to ensure that patients have been searched for weapons inside the CCP and prior to movement to a treatment area
- H. Provides IC or designee with current information on patients (e.g. total, acuity levels, and resource needs)

V. Medical Group Supervisor- (Fire or EMS) Officer responsible to manage the triage, treatment, and transportation of casualties. When large numbers of patients are encountered, or when they are separated by a distance that makes it impractical to have one treatment area, a Medical Branch may be established

- A. Operates in the Cold Zone
- B. Provides for the rapid triage, treatment, and transportation of injured persons
- C. Establishes/manages Patient Treatment Areas
- D. If Transportation Group Supervisor is not established, provides tracking and patient accountability
- E. Litter or SKED operations

- F. Develop traffic plan for the ingress, loading, and egress of ambulances
- G. Identify/secure landing zones (LZs) in coordination with law enforcement

VI. Fire Group Supervisor - (Fire) Fire Captain or Chief Officer responsible for the suppression of fires and coordination of the non-EMS operational fire discipline needs of the incident. Additional groups (i.e. US&R Group, Haz Mat Group, etc.) may be established based on the needs of the incident

- A. Assist law with evacuation of non-injured/walking wounded to appropriate collection points
- B. Haz Mat
 - 1. Hazard mitigation
 - 2. Patient/responder decontamination
- C. Fire Suppression
 - 1. Attack strategy (offensive vs defensive)
 - 2. Consider unstaffed master streams
 - 3. Fast attack
 - 4. Limited salvage, overhaul, ventilation
 - 5. Pre-plan water sources and routes into incident
- D. Mitigate IDLH conditions by extinguishment, denying entry, or isolation
- E. Utility control

VII. Law Group Supervisor- (Law) a supervisor from the agency with primary jurisdiction responsible for all law enforcement functions outside of the Tactical Group

- A. Outer Perimeter and access points
- B. Coordinates force protection for ICP and other Cold Zone operations including search for secondary threats
- C. Witness coordination
- D. Investigation
- E. Family assistance centers - reunification, accountability, victim tracking, mortuary services etc.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALLIED/ADJOINING LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

- I. Upon receiving information that an Active Shooter Incident is occurring in an adjoining jurisdiction, the allied jurisdiction field supervisors shall immediately initiate the process of staging available resources to appropriate locations that could compliment a timely response if a deployment of resources is requested.

- II. It shall be the priority responsibility of the ranking allied agency field supervisor, watch commander, or senior field officer on duty, to evaluate the nature of the developing Active Shooter Incident and to deploy available resources consistent with that evaluation. The officer or supervisor who initiates that decision shall proceed only under the following conditions:
 - A. That any deployment shall only commence after notification to and with the concurrence of ranking personnel of the agency of jurisdiction.
 - B. Self-deployment without notification and concurrence of the agency of jurisdiction shall only commence after all reasonable attempts to notify the agency have failed.
- III. In all cases involving a decision to deploy law enforcement resources to an allied jurisdiction, the ranking agency field supervisor, or senior field officer who initiates that decision, shall insure all proper notifications consistent with that agency's chain of command are complied with or initiated.
- IV. In the event that ALL resources of the agency of jurisdiction are deployed in the incident, it shall be the responsibility of the initial arriving units from adjoining jurisdictions to evaluate the need to establish Incident Command. (Refer to "Initial Actions - Law Enforcement" page 10)

POST-INCIDENT INVESTIGATION


- I. In most Active Shooter / Criminal Mass Casualty events, the investigative process will last much longer than the actual event and may involve multiple agencies. It is important for involved agencies to continue to work together to provide a complete and thorough investigation. Large events such as these may warrant mutual aid assistance through the Santa Clara County Mutual Aid Plan, as coordinated through the Santa Clara County Sheriff's Office.
- II. The primary investigative responsibility of an Active Shooter Incident shall lie with the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the location of the incident unless another law enforcement agency assumes primary investigative responsibility.
- III. A critical first step in the transition to the Post-Incident Investigation phase is a thorough briefing by initial responders at all levels.
- IV. Agencies are encouraged to coordinate their investigative efforts with:
 - A. Santa Clara County Office of the District Attorney
 1. Office of the District Attorney Bureau of Investigations
 - B. Office of the District Attorney Crime Laboratory
 - C. Federal Bureau of Investigation
 - D. Santa Clara County EMS Agency

- V. The Investigative Assistance for Violent Crimes Act of 2012 (HR 2076) authorizes the U.S. Attorney (through the deployment of the FBI) to assist, at the request of state or local authorities, with providing investigatory assistance in response to violent acts or shootings occurring in a place of public use and in investigation of mass killings (3 or more) and attempted mass killings.


DEPARTMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITMENTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

- I. Each agency is committed to insuring their staff receives the necessary training to respond to an active shooter event.
- II. Agencies should develop and review their own department active shooter procedures, training and tactics at least annually for the purpose of insuring their system incorporates the most current technologies and tactical philosophies.
- III. In the event of an Active Shooter Incident it shall be the responsibility of the law enforcement agency of jurisdiction to sponsor and organize an incident debriefing of the action for all interested regional agencies.
 - A. The debriefing should follow the event as soon as circumstances allow.
 - B. The intention and direction of the debriefing shall be for the education and preparedness of all regional interests.
 - C. The debriefing should include all involved parties from every agency involved. The use of a Critical Incident Stress Management Team should be strongly considered during this phase of the debriefing.

Active Shooter Incident Initial Response



Active Shooter Multi-Division/Group Response



Active Shooter Incident Multi-Branch Response

